Damn, I almost wish I wrote notes last year just so it'd make it easier to help you guys... okay this is off the top of my head so apologies if I miss anything/skim over anything too loosely.
Okay, now, to be honest, there really aren't many "argument arguments" in this book, but a lot of things get confused as such. For example, his opening page about happiness as our final end is more descriptive than syllogistically argumentative.
I'll just do a sort of outline, breaking the "argument arguments" into proper steps.
Bk I: Eudaimonia and telos
1. Our final end or "telos" is that towards which all activities aim. A final end must be sought in and of itself (ie not as a means to some further end). It also must be "self-sufficient" (ie dependent on no other thing). The final end for humans is eudaimonia, or flourishing.
2. Eudaimonia consists of two elements; living well and faring well.
3. In order to determine in what living well consists, Aristotle considers the unique function of man. He considers three things; nutrition & growth, sentience, and reason. Since our function is what is unique to man, it cannot be nutrition & growth (for this is posessed by plants), nor can it be mere sentience (animals have this). Thus, by exclusion, the unique function of man is *reason*. 'Living well' therefore consists in excellent performance of this function; i.e. "reasoning well".
Bk II: Moral Virtue
Aristotle believes that virtue is a state of character disposed to choose, with reference to reason, the "mean" in any given situation. The mean is the amount which is *beneficial* to you and the appropriate response. It lies between the vices of excess and deficit and is relative to context - ie it may differ from one person to another and situation to situation. An example of such a virtue would be courage, the mean lying between the excess of rashness and the deficit of cowardice.
Virtue is acquired through habituation. This is to say that repeated commission of virtuous acts lead to the formation of habits and develop a virtuous disposition. Perhaps even to begin with, such a person doesn't know why the act is virtuous or why they should do it; but over time they come to see this.
I find, personally, the analogy of a builder helps to illustrate this section. A builder is not necessarily automatically a good builder. A builder becomes a good builder by building things. Perhaps to begin with, they use plans and simply follow what the plans say. However, after they've built lots of things after years of experience, they no longer need the plans, and they come to be a good builder. That is to say that they tend to build well - just as a good man tends to choose the virtuous mean.
Hmmm what else is there...
Well, an act may be virtuous but not necessarily come from a virtuous disposition. For an action to be both virtuous and also be done in a virtuous way, the agent must a) have knowledge of what they're doing (ie do it on purpose) as well as knowing why they're doing it etc... b) choose it for its own sake not for the sake of anything else, and c) doing it from a fixed disposition (ie not just as a 'one off').
There's some stuff about pleasure that I ceebs talking about now, as well as some other stuff but yeahhh
if anyone has any specific questions just ask, it's difficult to help without narrow instruction
