I believe that "morality" is a construct, but that constructions are real, insofar that "reality" itself is all just a construct, so I am a moral realist in a sense, but also at the same time not really. Does that make sense?
Yeah I've been thinking over the last day that realism is sort of inescapable. I mean, even if I maintain virtue ethics and say that's the best way to moralise universally (but not necessarily objectively)... aren't I just saying that there is ONE objective fact, and that is that we ought to act in a way that is best for our internal well-being? Or if I subscribe to utilitarianism, aren't I saying there is ONE objective fact about morality, and that is, whatever brings about the most utility is what is moral?
Interestingly, I actually see "truth" as analogous to mathematics, and I think generally speaking acting in accordance to "truth" (which is in itself probably what I value as most important of all) corresponds to most of the things that we generally see as "moral", although that isn't necessarily because there is a sort of objective value attached to "truth", just that acting in accordance to "truth" tends to catalyse more beauty in the existences of the many, which is why in turn it often corresponds to what is "moral" (ie. what we would like upon society).
When you say act in accordance to truth, what do you mean? Are you saying integrity is a catalyst for beauty?
But can you see how even your justification is kind of circular? I completely understand your feelings (and you're doing valiantly here - please don't feel I'm attacking you, more just interrogating you :p), but you haven't really given a reason for why the government theory analysis doesn't hold other than "I FEEL LIKE THERE IS MORE". How can you be certain that you're not just confusing "moral" objectively with what is inscribed as "moral" because it fits the framework of government that best serves the interests of the people as a whole?
Hahaha yeah I see that. Heh, interrogate away; no one ever got anywhere without being challenged.
Alright. Here's what I've come up with. I've taken your meaning of interest to be similar to the way a preference utilitarian defines a preference, but I think you're also meaning 'serves the interests' as a general 'is good for the thriving of the community' or something similar to this. I've taken both definitions and melded them because I believe you might say that my second definition should be an extension of my first definition in re: government frameworks.
Note: any use of 'preference' is inclusive of my second definition, so when I say 'preference' I am also saying that things are in the best interest of whatever/whoever I'm talking about. If I use preference in a different way to this, I will make a note of it.
I will now argue that the government theory analysis is incomplete. The government theory analysis is focused externally on the preferences of society, however this may be measured. Perhaps advancement would be better quality of subsistence, less economic diversity (in the form of less poverty and more wealth) or what have you. However, this doesn't encompass the internal moral states of people. I am arguing from a virtue ethics perspective. As an extension of morality loosely being equivalent to internal well-being, people will be on a path to self-actualisation (as defined by the OED). So, realising internal 'moral' potentials is what would categorise a self-actualised person here -- as people fully realise the virtues they subscribe for their inner peace and well-being -- as opposed to someone fully realising their skill at basketball etc. So slavery will be immoral because it acts as an inhibitor for the moral self-actualisation (in terms of virtues, I realise self-actualisation is ambiguous so keep my definition in mind) of all parties involved. And so, in the scenario I earlier conceived where everyone has preferences for slavery (or stoning a woman?) - even if they have a preference for the destruction of X, or they have a strong hate of X or they subscribe to something we now find horrid, their immorality lies in the lack of universal love that is required for a morally self-actualised person. And so with the abolition of X horrible things, we move closer to moral self-actualisation (virtues etc), and thus we have real moral progress rather than a political progress that is only progression because it increases overall subsistence, opportunity, or whatever you want to define by the political progress.
*Also won't make a reply on this thread for a little while, Lit exam is tomorrow and I still plan to possibly re-read a book and otherwise prepare things I can bullshit