Hi everyone, I've started Int.Studies revision and wrote up this essay and just wanted to know whether I've answered the question right!
criticism will be much apppreciated!
7. The Bush Doctrine revealed the limits of American Power
The belligerence and unilateralism of the Bush Administration, exemplified in the Bush Doctrine, has revealed that even with great success, the United States faces limits in the exercise of its power. Evident since the end of World War Two and consolidated by the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, US power has thus far remained undefeated and unchallenged militarily, economically and culturally by any one state. Although the United States is unmatched in traditional aspects of power, the application of the Bush Doctrine of strategic pre-emption has nonetheless highlighted that in an ever globalising world with unorthodox challenges, a state may not simply rely on coercion to achieve its aims. Even as the worlds only superpower, the US is not immune to failure and is limited in the extent to which it may achieve its foreign policy objectives at will. Certainly, US pre-eminence allows it greater freedom to wield power in comparison to other states, but as the quagmire of Iraq has shown, overreliance on unilateralism, military power and disregard for international norms limits the ability of a state, even a superpower, to further its objectives in the long term. The Bush Administration was not the first, nor will it be the last administration to experience failure in the pursuit of national interests. However the application of the Bush Doctrine specifically, illuminates a variety of limits to American power in the post September 11 world.
Never formally enunciated as such, the themes of the Bush Doctrine- preventative war, combating terrorism, ‘regime change’ for ‘rogue states’, democracy promotion and confronting the development of weapons of mass destruction – have been constant throughout the first term of the Bush administration, their prominence heightened by the September 11 World Trade Centre attacks. The doctrine, a major source of contention since its inception, asserts the right of the United States to use armed force against any actor deemed a possible threat to US security at some point in the future. The Doctrine’s heavy focus on maintaining and promoting US primacy unilaterally, particularly through what Joseph Nye has termed ‘hard power’ and the application of these principles, has strongly illuminated the limits to US power when it is centred on military action.
US military might is overwhelming; the budget, technology and capabilities of conventional American forces are unmatched by any other state. Nonetheless, September 11 and the global war on terror have shown that even the US, with its military supremacy, is still vulnerable to unconventional attacks that have the potential to undermine and constrain American military power. In both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, American preponderance allowed the US to make decisive victories over the Taliban and Saddam Hussein respectively. Nevertheless, despite decisive initial victories and the pronouncement of a ‘mission accomplished’ in Iraq, American power appears to be quite limited. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces have failed to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban movement which has managed to reassemble and pose a threat. Similarly in Iraq, initial successes pale in comparison to the protracted insurgency struggle facing the US. What were envisioned as ‘cakewalk’ invasions of weaker states, that would validate the Bush Doctrine by many in the Bush Administration, have instead revealed deficits in US military power. Granted no state had the power to stop US pre-emptive strikes on Iraq, but the asymmetric nature of conflict in the post-9/11 world has meant that the American military machine has been unable to cope with the clandestine nature of insurgents and terrorists. While US and coalition forces are visible in their tanks and uniforms, vulnerable to even homemade bombs (Improvised Explosive Devices), mobile terrorist organisations are ‘less identifiable and…therefore less vulnerable to reprisal’. The Bush Doctrine has revealed US military power as a means of deterrence fails when the enemy is a suicide bomber who welcomes death. Moreover, not only does the Bush Doctrine reveal deficits in US military power, it also highlights the extent to which unilateral coercion depletes a nations economic wellbeing and limits economic power.
In conducting the war on terror, the United States has displayed how vital economic power is to the Bush Doctrine. The ability of the US to act unilaterally lies heavily on the fact that it has the economic strength to support such an extensive military and use economic incentives to pursue its policy objectives. The ability of the US to pressure Pakistan into joining the war on terror, despite the problems it caused domestically, can arguably be attributed to US economic power in the form of aid and lifting sanctions imposed in 1998 over nuclear testing . In the example of Pakistan it is evident that the US is “better placed to set its own terms” however this also reveals limits to US power because “economics may disrupt but not deter nonstate terrorists” . Moreover, the Bush Doctrine’s focus on predominantly unilateral ‘regime change’ further elucidates limits to US power in an economic sense. Unlike the first Gulf War when ‘Germany, Japan and friendly Gulf states ponied up tens of billions of dollars to defray the cost of US Operations’, the burden of the current Iraq War has fallen on Washington. As the scope of military activity under the Bush Doctrine has grown so too has the cost of operations. The Pentagon’s annual budget under the Bush Administration has “more than doubled, reaching $700 billion by 2008 .Some estimates are already that the final bill could reach at least $2 trillion . The costs of the implementation of the Bush Doctrine have revealed that implementing regime change is extremely costly to a state, even if it ‘constitutes such a large part of the market in trade and finance’ .Moreover, economic power as leverage can be useful with states but is nonetheless rendered effectively useless as a deterrent to nonstate actors. However, American unilateralism through the Bush Doctrine has not only revealed limits to Washington’s military and economic power; arguably it has most significantly highlighted the damage the Bush Doctrine has done to American ‘soft power’.
American ‘soft power’, based on its culture, ideology and institutions, has been exercised by ‘attracting others to subscribe to, and thus legitimise, the order established’ by Washington. Since the end of World War II, the ability of the US to ‘co-opt’ rather than ‘coerce’ the international community, has been a great advantage to the US. With the zeal of Hollywood, the triumph of free market capitalism over Soviet communism and the lure of ‘democratic’ values, the United States has been able to alter the desires of the world in ways that have suited it. However, ‘imperious’ policies utilising American hard power to pursue policy objectives by the Bush Administration have undercut US soft power.
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