Hey! Awesome, love that you are considering giving a thematic structure a go. Even if you end up liking the other structure better, always good to have this essay form in your arsenal
Though political, social and economic are definitely the most commonly used themes, if you find it easier militaristic/strategic, ideological and cultural also count as themes too! I actually think a few of your examples might work better with these; for example I'd venture a guess and say that the invasion of China would be an example for a militaristic/strategic paragraph! I'd assume that the proclamation of New Order in East Asia would be political and/or social, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS) would be political (and maybe economic, if it included aspects of trade). However of course as I didn't study this, take these suggestions with a grain of salt.
In terms of your second question - I think it is fine to include it, but try to steer away from morality (ie. don't say this was morally good or morally bad). I think saying that it was inevitable, or a reasonable reaction however is fine
And yes, as long as in your introduction you use the full title, you can definitely refer to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as GEACPS
Just because foreign policy questions in particular have been being asked quite a lot recently, for multiple case studies, within the spoiler I have included one of my essays on Soviet Foreign Policy, to hopefully indicate the way I structured my responses
Spoiler
How successful was Soviet foreign policy in achieving its aims from 1917 to 1941?
The incompatibility of the key aims of Soviet foreign policy – domestic stability and international revolution – greatly limited its accomplishments, as the promotion of one aim effectively reduced the opportunity for the other, and thus it is clear that Soviet foreign policy was only partially successful in achieving its aims from 1917 to 1941. Though the aims and purposes of Soviet foreign policy fluctuated depending upon the current leadership of the Bolsheviks Party and the changing domestic and international tensions, it is evident that the goals of domestic socio-political stability and a worldwide socialist revolution remained significant, thus projecting the Soviet Union into an internal conflict between pragmatism and ideological adherence. Though initially the principle aim appeared to be the promotion of a global socialist revolution, as dictated by the Bolshevik ideological position of Permanent Revolution, it is clear through the increasing implementation of self-preservationist policies throughout the period that the Bolsheviks aim of survival outweighed their desire to spread socialism. This is evident through the various militaristic/strategic, economic, diplomatic and socio-cultural factors that impacted or were impacted by soviet foreign policy between 1917 to 1941, which dictated its success.
It is evident through the the militaristic and strategic foreign policies implemented from 1917 to 1941 that the aims of the Soviet Union had shifted towards the consolidation and preservation of the Bolshevik state rather than the expansion of their ideology, thus it is clear through being forced to forgo certain key aims that soviet foreign policy was only partially successful. Despite Permanent Revolution, the official party policy of the Bolsheviks requiring an international revolution in order to succeed, the primary concerns after the 1917 Revolution was the consolidation of their power within Russia. The political climate was still largely unstable, therefore the Bolsheviks had to immediately return upon their promises of “Peace. Bread. Land,” in order to consolidate their power, the peace component of which had a significant impact upon soviet foreign policy through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, as it ensured their exit from the increasingly unpopular international conflict World War I. The signing of the Treaty demonstrates the shift in strategic foreign policy focus from ideological adherence to pragmatism, as it signified the abandonment of the Permanent Revolution principles and their aim of an international socialist revolution in order to achieve domestic stability and the survival of the Bolshevik state. This shift was further demonstrated through the Soviets contradictory (in regards to their ideology) support of the leftist parties within the Spanish Civil War in order to prevent a socialist revolution within Spain, aiding the Republicans with materials, arms and over 2000 Russian citizens as soldiers due to their fears that increased instability would enable the rise and spread of German fascism within the region, which would pose a significant domestic security threat. Along with this, the Soviets under Stalin endeavoured to maintain an alliance with the Nationalists in China, due to his belief that the Chinese Communists were too few to achieve anything, which further demonstrates the Bolshevik governments willingness to forgo ideology in favour of more pragmatic foreign policy. Therefore, through the various strategic and militaristic foreign policies implemented by the Bolshevik Party, it is clear that though successful in regards to the preservation of the Bolshevik state, soviet foreign policy was unsuccessful in instigating an international revolution, and therefore was only partially successful in achieving its aims from 1917 to 1941.
It is evident through the economic and diplomatic foreign policies implemented by the Bolsheviks Party between 1917 and 1941 that the Soviet leaders main concern was the survival of the Bolshevik state rather than the spread of socialism, and thus attempted through economic means to reduce hostilities and tensions between themselves and their capitalist neighbours. Despite the Soviets aims and predictions of a world revolution, this did not occur, and thus the Bolshevik Government, which had been, during the time, producing highly critical assessments upon the opposing ideology of capitalism both through policy and the media now found themselves surrounded by capitalist neighbours, Lynch stating “The Soviet Union’s often antagonistic behaviour towards the capitalist countries frequently produced counter blasts … [meaning] that international tension never wholly slackened”. This is evident through the continued poor relations between Russia and post-war Germany, which banned the Communist Party in 1919, and the assessments from other nations leaders, such as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who described communism as “not a policy, it is a disease.” Thus in order to reduce tension and hostilities amongst their capitalist neighbours, the Bolshevik government entered into various Trade agreements during the 1920s that ensured the peaceful co-existence of the two opposing ideologies. A number of capitalist countries entered into these trade agreements with the USSR, such as Italy, Germany and Britain (The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement). Along with this, Russia became involved within various international diplomatic organisations and agreements, evident through there admittance into the League of Nations in 1934, and the Rapallo Treaty, which was highly significant in reducing the tensions between the Soviets and Germany, as it signified the relinquishing of territorial and financial claims against each other, thus easing the pressures of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, with the aim to “co-operate in a spirit of goodwill in meeting the economic needs of both countries.” Though this increased cooperation with Germany had a positive impact upon the security and consolidation of the Bolshevik state, a destabilised Germany was far more likely to fall to a socialist revolution, and thus it is evident that the Bolsheviks prioritized self-preservation over the aim of worldwide revolution. Therefore, through the various economic and diplomatic foreign policies implemented by the Bolshevik party, it is clear that though successful in regards to the preservation of the Bolshevik state through the reduction of hostilities and tensions, soviet foreign policy was unsuccessful in instigating an international revolution, and therefore was only partially successful in achieving its aims from 1917 to 1941. The aim to survive through a reduction in tensions within the capitalist neighbour was further demonstrated through their implementation of diplomatic foreign policy.
Through the failures of various revolutionary socio-cultural foreign policies implemented by the Bolshevik party between 1917 and 1941, it is evident that soviet foreign policy was ineffective in achieving an international revolution, and thus, despite it’s self-preservationist success, was only partially successful in achieving its aims from 1917 to 1941. Early forms of soviet foreign policy, particularly under the leadership of Lenin, greatly focused upon the ideologically based aim of promoting an international socialist revolution. This is evident through the 1919 creation of the Communist International (also known as the Comintern), which had the revolutionary task of promoting and co-ordinating the communist parties of the world in an effort to advocate a global communist system. This is evident through their aim to “overthrow … the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic,” and the formation of the United Front, whereby communists propose to fight alongside non-communist workers in a “common struggle to defend … the working class against the bourgeoisie.” However, after a failed attempt to start a world revolution through the Polish invasion of Russia, the Comintern realised that peaceful coexistence with Europe was the only option, with Lynch stating that “between 1918 and 1920 … the Comintern was concerned sole with safeguarding the interests of Soviet Russia.” This preoccupation with the interests of Russia was continued under the soviet foreign policy actions of Stalin, with Lynch stating that “he set himself the primary task of defending his country’s interests in a hostile world,” and thus ordered the Comintern to cease appeals for global revolution due to the fact that after joining the League of Nations in 1934 Russia now had non-communist allies, and that no communist-inspired revolts had actually succeeded anywhere in the world at that time. Therefore, through the various attempts and failures to instigate effective revolutionary socio-cultural foreign policies, it is evident that soviet foreign policy, despite it’s self-preservationist success, was only partially successful in achieving its aims from 1917 to 1941.
Therefore, it is evident through the various socio-cultural, diplomatic, economic and militaristic/strategic factors that soviet foreign policy was successful in ensuring the survival of the Bolshevik state, however at the expense of their other principle aim – the promotion of an international socialist revolution. Thus, it is evident that soviet foreign policy was only partially successful in achieving its aims from 1917 to 1941, as the incompatibility between their pragmatic aim of stability and ideological aim of international revolution meant that they could only focus upon one aspect of their aims while forgoing the other.
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