Does anybody have any tips for making a paragraph on how Nazi ideology, specifically in relation to race, influenced foreign policy up to 1939? So far I've got that the Slavs in conquered territories were treated as inferior populations, and the idea of racial purity heavily encouraged the Nazis' plans for territorial expansion to provide more living space for a German master race. Any help would be appreciated
(I reread this after writing it and it's a complete mess, sorry)
Hey av-angie-er, I think the hardest part of this question is keeping stuff within the time-frame, because a lot of the best evidence to this question comes from beyond 1939. The poor treatment of local populations in the Occupied Territories was a huge example of ideology influencing Nazi foreign policy in strategically poor ways, but this is beyond the scope of the national study unfortunately.
Dancing phalanges was totally right about Lebensraum, and it's always a major consideration in questions on Nazi-Foreign policy, but to keep things before 1939 I would suggest focusing on the idea of the Grossdeutsches Reich as a precursor to Lebensraum, that is, a nation that sought to unite and promote all Germans regardless of existing international boundaries. For this you would first address the ideology behind this and identify its origins in Mein Kampf and the Volkisch populist movement, predating Nazism. After this, you would point to the increasingly aggressive stages of Nazi Foreign policy that influence this, most importantly, the Saar Plebiscite in January 1935, the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, the Munich Conference and annexation of the Sudetenland in November 1938, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in January 1939.
What you would want to identify in this pattern is how German foreign policy in this aspect of their ideology began very tentatively and diplomatically with the Saar Plebiscite, and became increasingly militaristic to the point of complete dismissal of international law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The conclusion this would lead to is that while German foreign policy from 1935-1939 did act to promote Nazi ideology, this was always contingent on Germany's military capabilities, bearing in mind that the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe had only been officially formed in 1935 and Hitler's orders for the remilitarisation of the Rhineland told soldiers to retreat at the slightest opposition from the French, as the army was in no position to wage war at that point.
To add sophistication to this point, there is an important counterpoint that these actions were an extension of pre-Nazi foreign policy from the Weimar era. The strongest evidence for this is that under the 1925 Locarno Pact, Stresemann only committed Germany to fixed boundaries along its Western borders, as he always intended on restoring pre-WW1 borders in the East to include German populations now living in Poland and Bohemia. I think AJP Taylor argues this, but I'm not sure. If this counterpoint is true, then it is misleading to just say that Nazi ideology influenced German foreign policy without the caveat that these goals predated Nazism and were shared by others, and were often practically motivated rather than ideologically motivated (the evidence for this is that Germany
needed to invade Poland in 1939 because its economy was on the verge of collapse due to Hitler's mismanagement. This is Richard J. Evans' argument, which he called the "plunder economy").