Every epoch, aeon and era is indelibly marked by the pen of time. Whether in continuity or change, the paths chosen by men, movements and militias have inscribed the books of history. Today we will delve into the outcomes of the Soviet Union’s aggressive act of placing nuclear missiles on Cuban territory and the role it played in drawing the USA and the USSR towards a détente. Ultimately, the Cuban Missile Crisis acted as a catalyst in enabling the two superpowers to move towards a more peaceful relationship.
In order to fully understand the movements to a rapprochement, a brief outline of the event is necessary. The tense 13-day show-down stemmed from Russian placement of Nuclear missiles in Cuba, a newly formed communist state. Being merely 780 km away from America they were capable of striking major east American cities posing a monumental threat to the country. These missiles attempted to counteract the US missiles placed in Turkey, equidistant and equally threatening to Russia. The mutual mistrust led to a dangerous display of brinkmanship. Cataclysmic disaster was averted through the American naval blockade of Cuban waters prompting Russian cargo ships laden with offensive weaponry to turn aside. The confrontation was the closest the Cold War came to a full-scale nuclear conflict and brought both Washington and Moscow to realise a new approach was urgently required to prevent another serious confrontation.
The proximity of nuclear war acted as an impetus for a large range of treaty’s and served to bring the leaders and governments to their senses who previously played a perilous game of defiance and total noncooperation. Though initially dealing with nuclear weaponry policy, the pacts conditioned the countries to “more favourable conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties” . On the 5 August 1963, the ‘Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ was signed, the first of its kind; a trilateral agreement signed by the Soviets, UK, and USA in Moscow. The Partial Test Ban Treaty represented the first concrete step toward a goal that had been sought since the very outset of the nuclear age , ‘peace’. Vojtech Mastny, argues in the ‘Journal of Cold War Studies’ that the partial ban was “a poor substitute for the superpowers’ failure to address the underlying political causes of their ongoing rivalry” . However, in proscribing nuclear explosions, in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater, the treaty eased nuclear tension and provided political ratification for future talks such the 1973 Washington Summit and the Moscow Summit of 1988 which both increased bilateral cooperation in more rudimentary areas such as trade, health and space exploration. The treaty represented a major step in ameliorating the relationship which estranged both nations for the previous 18 years. The countries were bound tighter with the rope of parallelism as both countries became aware of the digression from the harmonious tie which existed until the end of the Second World War.
The Cuban Missile Crisis led both nations’ leaders to see the evident need for a secure line of immediate communication. With the fast-paced events of the Incident, the delay of communication was a major hindrance in finding a solution and contributed to the ‘fog of war’. Khrushchev’s original settlement message of 2000 words took over 12 hours to receive and decode. Due to the delay, Washington having drafted a reply, received a tougher ultimatum demanding that US missiles be withdrawn from Turkey – a hard-hitting stipulation. Solving this problem was the "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Line", signed by Soviet and American representatives on June 20, 1963. This permitted a direct cable and microwave system covering a distance of [8300 KM] , leading directly from the Kremlin to the Pentagon. The dire penalties of miscalculation during crises, necessitated the ‘rapid exchange of information’ in both a political and military scope. Providing a significant conduit for bilateral communication, the ‘hot-line’ bought the countries into an orbit of renewed peaceful existence allowing the negotiation of trivial affairs in a quick and diplomatic manner – limiting the chances of escalation into hemispherical nuclear war.
From the very outset of the crisis, a new era of Cold War history can be traced. Kennedy’s very act of pursuing a less-violent option of the blockade of Cuba lead to a monumental shift from antagonistic foreign policy to a more diplomatic agenda of negotiation. Rather than attempting to gain concessions from their opponents, both Chairman Khrushchev and Kennedy focused on conflict resolution. Though seen as a departure from the standard policy of ‘intimidation’, the adopted agenda of both sides facilitated a ‘thaw’ in Cold War relations. America did not pursue a ‘Pax Americana’ rather, the administration simply removed the missiles from Turkey, relieving the Soviets of the threat on their door-step. Similarly, the Soviets relinquished their reckless visions of regional or global hegemony. Following the crisis, both sides realised the importance of diplomatic negotiation in dealing with conflicts while politics came into a new focus of the power of diplomacy. This change paved the way for the wheels of peace, as they continued to roll.